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Abstract    
 
Moral judgment depends critically on theory of mind (ToM), reasoning about mental states such 
as beliefs and intentions. People assign blame for failed attempts to harm and offer forgiveness in 
the case of accidents. Here we use fMRI to investigate the role of ToM in moral judgment of 
harmful versus helpful actions. Is ToM deployed differently for judgments of blame versus 
praise? Participants evaluated agents who produced a harmful, helpful, or neutral outcome, based 
a harmful, helpful, or neutral intention; participants made blame and praise judgments. In the 
right temporo-parietal junction (right TPJ), and, to a lesser extent, the left TPJ and medial 
prefrontal cortex, the neural response reflected an interaction between belief and outcome 
factors, for both blame and praise judgments: the response in these regions was highest when 
participants delivered a negative moral judgment, i.e. assigned blame or withheld praise, based 
solely on the agent’s intent (attempted harm, accidental help). These results show enhanced 










 Many recent studies have targeted the cognitive processes and neural substrates that 
support moral judgment (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; M. Gazzaniga, 2005; Greene, 
Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Haidt, 2001; Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 
2009; Mikhail, 2007; Moll, et al., 2005; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). The majority of these studies 
focus on participants’ negative evaluations of moral violations, for instance, hitting people with 
trolleys, breaking promises, distributing resources unfairly, and eating dead pets (Borg, Hynes, 
Van Horn, Grafton, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006; Cushman, 2008; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, 
Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 2007; Hsu, Anen, & Quartz, 
2008). Moral judgments across these cases reflect a multitude of cognitive processes, including 
emotional responses to bad behavior and its effects (Harenski & Hamaan, 2006; Heekeren, 
Wartenburger, Schmidt, Schwintowski, & Villringer, 2003), as well as representations of the 
agent’s mind, including his or her beliefs and intentions, i.e.  “theory of mind” (ToM) (Borg, et 
al., 2006; Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007). Moral psychology, however, encompasses 
not just negative evaluation but also positive evaluation, which has received less attention so far. 
The positive psychology movement (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) has led some 
researchers to study positive moral emotions (Haidt, 2003) and the neural signatures of 
cooperative behavior (de Quervain, et al., 2004; Moll, et al., 2006; Rilling, et al., 2002) as well as 
subjective responses to moral virtues (Takahashi, et al., 2008). These studies have focused 
primarily on the distinctiveness of positive emotions and their neural substrates. 
 The current study seeks to extend this tradition by taking a different approach. Here we 
focus on one of the many cognitive processes implicated in moral judgment – theory of mind – 
for evaluating not only harmful but also helpful actions. Prior behavioral work suggests that 
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theory of mind may play different roles in moral blame versus praise. First, people assign less 
blame for impulsive as compared to deliberate harms (e.g., crimes of passion versus 
premeditated crimes) but do not distinguish between impulsive and deliberate helpful actions (D. 
Pizarro, Uhlmann, & Salovey, 2003). Second, people judge actions with negative side effects to 
be more intentional (e.g., supporting a profitable policy that also harms the environment) than 
actions with positive side effects (Knobe, 2005). Third, people rely on different kinds of mental 
states, in the case of side effects; blame is based relatively more on the agent’s belief (e.g., that 
harm will be done), and praise on the agent’s desire (e.g., to be helpful; F. Cushman, personal 
communication). The current study uses functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to 
investigate the role of theory of mind for moral judgments of blame and praise. At the broadest 
level, we aim to investigate whether brain regions that support theory of mind for non-moral 
judgments (e.g., behavior prediction and explanation) are differentially recruited for evaluating 
harmful and helpful actions, and whether, within this neural network, the same brain regions are 
recruited for blame and praise. 
 This study therefore builds on prior fMRI investigations into theory of mind in non-moral 
contexts. These prior studies show consistent neural activation for the processing of verbal and 
visual stimuli that depict mental states: the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), right and left 
temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ, LTPJ), and precuneus (den Ouden, Frith, Frith, & Blakemore, 
2005; Fletcher, et al., 1995; Frith & Frith, 2003; Gallagher, et al., 2000; Ruby & Decety, 2003; 
Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Vogeley, et al., 2001). Of these regions, the RTPJ has been shown to 
be particularly selective for processing mental states with representational content such as 
thoughts and beliefs (Aichhorn, Perner, Kronbichler, Staffen, & Ladurner, 2006; Ciaramidaro, et 
al., 2007; Gobbini, Koralek, Bryan, Montgomery, & Haxby, 2007; Perner, Aichhorn, 
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Kronbichler, Staffen, & Ladurner, 2006; Saxe & Wexler, 2005). For example, the response in the 
RTPJ is high when participants read stories that describe a person’s beliefs, true or false, but low 
during other socially salient stories describing, for example, a person’s physical appearance, 
cultural background, or even internal subjective sensations that lack representational content, i.e. 
hunger or fatigue (Saxe & Powell, 2006 ). Typically, the LTPJ shows a similar response profile; 
however, recent work suggests the LTPJ may play a more general role in representation 
selection, regardless of the content of the representation (Perner, et al., 2006). More specifically, 
Perner and colleagues found that the LTPJ is activated not only by false beliefs but also by false 
signs, indicating that the LTPJ may be responsible for processing generic perspective differences 
in both the mental and the non-mental domain (Perner, et al., 2006). By contrast, the RTPJ was 
activated only for false beliefs. 
 The critical role of these brain regions, including the RTPJ, for evaluating harmful actions 
has also been the topic of recent research, using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) 
(Young, Camprodon, Hauser, Pascual-Leone, & Saxe, 2010) and fMRI (Young, et al., 2007). For 
example, the same regions for theory of mind in non-moral contexts were recruited when 
participants read explicit statements of agents’ beliefs about whether or not they would cause 
harm (e.g. “Grace thinks the powder is poison”) and then judged the moral permissibility of the 
action (e.g., “Grace puts the powder in her friend’s coffee”) (Young & Saxe, 2008). During the 
moral judgment, the RTPJ showed not only a robust response but also an interaction between 
belief and outcome (Young, et al., 2007): the RTPJ response was significantly higher for failed 
attempts to harm (negative belief / intent, neutral outcome), as compared to all other conditions, 
including the other false belief condition, i.e. accidental harm (neutral belief / intent, negative 
outcome). In general, this interaction suggests that the RTPJ is involved not only in the initial 
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encoding of the explicitly stated belief, and as well as perhaps the inferred intention, but also in 
the integration of the belief with the outcome for moral judgment. Moreover, the precise pattern 
of activation (i.e. high response for attempted but not accidental harms) shows that the RTPJ 
does not simply respond to false beliefs, which are incompatible with the actual outcomes. 
Convergent TMS evidence suggests that temporarily disrupting RTPJ activity using online and 
offline TMS has the most pronounced effect on moral judgments of attempted harms as well, 
biasing participants to judge attempted harms more leniently, based on the neutral outcome, 
rather than the negative intent (Young, et al., 2010). 
 The functional profile observed in the RTPJ then presents a puzzle. Why is the RTPJ most 
robustly recruited during moral judgments of attempted harms? One interpretation is that the 
enhanced RTPJ activation reflects greater attention to or deeper encoding of mental states when 
moral judgments depend primarily on mental states. Moral condemnation in the absence of an 
actual harm (e.g., attempted harm) must depend heavily on the agent’s belief or intention. By 
contrast, in the case of intentional harm, the actor’s causal role in bringing about an actual harm 
might additionally contribute to moral condemnation (Cushman, 2008). However, a problem for 
this interpretation is the lower response to accidental harms. Forgiving or exculpating an agent 
for causing harm accidentally, based on a false belief (Young & Saxe, 2009b), must also depend 
heavily on a representation of the agent’s mental state, specifically the false belief. The pattern of 
results thus suggests an amended view: the neural processes for mental state reasoning are most 
robustly recruited when a negative moral judgment depends on the agent’s belief or intent. In 
other words, moral judgment and mental state reasoning may interact such that (1) mental states 
(in this case, beliefs or inferred intentions) are weighed more heavily when they form the 
predominant basis of moral judgment (e.g., when the belief / intent conflicts with the outcome), 
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and (2) mental states are weighed more heavily for negative (as opposed to neutral or positive) 
moral judgments. These two influences may underlie the pattern of neural activation. We’ll call 
this hypothesis the “Intuitive Prosecutor Hypothesis” whereby participants attend especially to 
evidence (here, mental state evidence) that supports a relatively negative moral verdict, in other 
words, shifts moral judgments downward, assigning blame in the absence of a negative outcome, 
or withholding praise in the presence of a positive outcome.  
 On the other hand, the interaction observed in the RTPJ could also be explained by an 
alternative account. On this view, which we’ll call the “Goal Incompletion Hypothesis” (R. 
Baillargeon, personal communication), the enhanced RTPJ activation reflects the processing of a 
salient goal (e.g., trying to poison a friend) that the agent fails to complete, as in the case of a 
failed murder attempt. The response is thus low for intentional harms, because the agent 
successfully completes the salient goal, and low for accidental harms, because the original goal 
of the action, which the agent failed to complete, was not especially salient (e.g., sweetening a 
friend’s coffee). On the Goal Incompletion Hypothesis then, participants attend especially to 
salient mental states, such as murderous desires, that don’t amount to murder in the end.  
 The current paper both (1) investigates the neural processes that support theory of mind for 
blame versus praise, and (2) tests the Intuitive Prosecutor versus Goal Incompletion Hypotheses. 
Participants read modified versions of the harm scenarios used in our previous research as well 
as new “help” scenarios, both in a 2 x 2 design: protagonists produced a valenced (harmful or 
helpful) outcome or neutral outcome, based on a valenced or neutral intent. Participants made 
judgments of moral blame (for harm scenarios) and moral praise (for help scenarios). In general, 
we tested whether the same ToM brain regions would be recruited for both kinds of moral 
judgments. More specifically, using scenarios featuring positive goals (e.g., helping other 
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people) allowed us to test our two hypotheses. When agents attempt to help others but fail 
(“attempted help”), their goals are salient but incomplete. When agents end up helping others 
accidentally, based on false beliefs and no intention to help (“accidental help”), then a relatively 
negative moral judgment (withholding praise) is based on the belief or intention. (We note that a 
“negative moral judgment” in the case of the help scenarios may still involve praise, only low 
levels of praise.) On the Goal Incompletion Hypothesis, participants reason more about any 
salient incomplete goal; therefore, the RTPJ response should be high for attempted help, just like 
attempted harm, and lower for accidental help. On the Intuitive Prosecutor Hypothesis, 
participants reason more about beliefs and intentions that support negative moral judgments; 
therefore, the RTPJ response should be high for accidental help (low praise), just like attempted 
harm (high blame), and lower for attempted help.  
 
Methods 
 Seventeen right-handed subjects (aged 18-22 years, ten women) participated in the study 
for payment. Behavioral data were collected but later lost from the first five subjects; behavioral 
analyses therefore reflect data from twelve subjects (eight women) (see Supplementary 
Information). All subjects were native English speakers, had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision and gave written informed consent in accordance with the requirements of Internal 
Review Board at MIT. Subjects were scanned at 3T (at the MIT scanning facility in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts) using twenty-six 4-mm-thick near-axial slices covering the whole brain. Standard 
echoplanar imaging procedures were used (TR = 2 sec, TE = 40 msec, flip angle 90°). 
 Stimuli consisted of two sets of scenarios: (1) four variations (conditions) of 24 harm 
scenarios and (2) four variations of 24 help scenarios for a total of 192 stories (see Figure 1a for 
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sample scenarios and http://www.mit.edu/~lyoung/files/ for full text). For harm scenarios: (i) 
agents produced either a negative outcome (harm to others) or a neutral outcome (no harm), and 
(ii) agents believed they were causing a negative outcome (“negative” belief / intent) or a neutral 
outcome (“neutral” belief / intent). For help scenarios: (i) agents produced either a positive 
outcome (help to others) or a neutral outcome (no help), and (ii) agents believed they were 
causing a positive outcome (“positive” belief / intent) or a neutral outcome (“neutral” belief / 
intent). Helpful outcomes included benefits to others. Harmful outcomes included injuries to 
others. Word count was matched across harm conditions and help conditions (see Supplementary 
Information). Stories were presented in four cumulative segments, each presented for 6 s, for a 
total presentation time of 24 s per story (see Figure 1b for timeline of a single trial):  
(1) Background: information to set the scene (identical across conditions) 
(2) Foreshadow: information foreshadowing outcome (valenced or neutral) 
(3) Belief: the agent’s belief about the situation (valenced or neutral) 
(4) Action and Outcome: the agent’s action and actual outcome (valenced or neutral) 
We note that while the stimuli explicitly specified the agent’s belief about whether he or she 
would harm or help another person, participants could also infer the agent’s intention with 
respect to the action and outcome. Pilot behavioral data suggest that the current stimuli support 
assumptions about the agents’ desires and intentions, i.e. if Grace thought the powder was 
poison, she probably wanted to poison her friend. Each version of the belief was true for one 
outcome and false for the other outcome (e.g., the negative belief was true if the story ended with 
the negative outcome and false if the story ended with the neutral outcome). After 24 s, the story 
was removed, and replaced by a question concerning how much moral blame (for harm 
scenarios) or praise (for help scenarios) the protagonist deserves for his or her action, from none 
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(1) to a lot (4), using a button press. The question was on the screen for 4 s.  
 Subjects saw one variation of each scenario, for a total of 48 stories. Stories were presented 
in a pseudorandom order, the order of conditions counterbalanced across runs and across 
subjects, while ensuring that no condition was immediately repeated. Eight stories were 
presented in each 5.6 min run; the total experiment, involving six runs, lasted 33.6 min. Fixation 
blocks of 14 s were interleaved between each story. The text of the stories was presented in a 
white 24-point font on a black background. Stories were projected onto a screen via Matlab 5.0 
running on an Apple G4 laptop. 
 In the same scan session, subjects participated in four runs of a theory of mind localizer 
task (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003), contrasting stories requiring inferences about false beliefs with 
control stories, matched for linguistic complexity and logical structure, requiring inferences 
about “false” physical representations, i.e. a photograph or map that had become outdated. 
Stimuli and story presentation for the theory of mind localizer task were exactly as described in 
Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003, Experiment 2. 
 
FMRI analysis 
 MRI data were analyzed using SPM2 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) and custom 
software. Each subject’s data were motion corrected and normalized onto a common brain space 
(Montreal Neurological Institute, MNI, template). Data were smoothed using a Gaussian filter 
(full width half maximum = 5 mm) and high-pass filtered during analysis. A slow event-related 
design was used and modeled using a boxcar regressor to estimate the hemodynamic response 
for each condition. An event was defined as a single story, and the event onset was defined by 
the onset of text on screen. The timing of story components was constant for every story, so 
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independent parameter estimates could not be created for each component. The response to each 
component was instead analyzed in the time series extracted from the ROIs (see below). 
 Both random effects whole-brain analyses (over the entire time course) and tailored regions 
of interest (ROI) analyses were conducted. Six ROIs were defined for each subject individually 
based on a whole brain analysis of the independent localizer experiment, and defined as 
contiguous voxels that were significantly more active (p < 0.001, uncorrected) (Saxe, Brett, & 
Kanwisher, 2006) while the subject read belief stories, as compared with photograph stories. All 
peak voxels are reported in MNI coordinates (Table 1).  
 The responses of these ROIs were then measured while subjects read moral stories from 
the current study. Within the ROI, the average percent signal change (PSC) relative to fixation 
(PSC = 100 × raw BOLD magnitude for (condition − fixation)/raw BOLD magnitude for 
fixation) was calculated for each condition at each time point (averaging across all voxels in the 
ROI and all blocks of the same condition). PSC during story presentation (adjusted for 




Theory of Mind Localizer Experiment  
 A whole-brain random effects analysis of the data replicated results of previous studies 
using the same task (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003), revealing a higher BOLD response during belief 
stories as compared to physical stories, in the RTPJ, LTPJ, dorsal (d), middle (m), and ventral (v) 
MPFC, and precuneus (PC) (p < 0.05, family-wise correction). ROIs were identified in 
individual subjects at the same threshold (Table 1): RTPJ (identified in 17 of 17 subjects), LTPJ 
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(17/17), PC (17/17), DMPFC (14/17), MMPFC (11/17), and VMPFC (11/17). 
 
Moral Judgment: Behavioral Results  
 Subjects evaluated the moral status of actions on a scale from no blame / praise (1) to a lot 
of blame / praise (4). Blame and praise judgments of harm and help scenarios, respectively, as 
well as reaction times (see Supplementary Information) were analyzed using separate 2x2 
(outcome [negative / positive vs. neutral] by belief [negative / positive vs. neutral]) repeated 
measures ANOVAs (Figure 2). 
 Harm: Predicted main effects of outcome and belief were observed. Agents producing 
negative outcomes were judged more morally blameworthy than those causing neutral outcomes 
(negative: 2.84, neutral: 2.15; F(1, 11)=26.9 p=3.0x10-4, partial η2=0.71). Agents with “negative” 
beliefs were judged more morally blameworthy than those with “neutral” beliefs (negative: 3.28, 
neutral: 1.71; F(1, 11)=1.0x102 p=1.0x10-6, partial η2=0.90). There was no significant interaction 
between belief and outcome.  
 Judgments of negative outcomes were faster than neutral outcomes (F(1, 11)=12.3 
p=0.005, partial η2=0.53); there was no effect of belief on reaction time. There was an 
interaction between belief and outcome (F(1, 11)=20.9 p=0.001, partial η2=0.66), driven by a 
faster response to intentional harm (mean: 2.0 s, SD: 0.5) than the other conditions: accidental 
harm (mean: 2.3 s, SD: 0.6), attempted harm (mean: 2.5 s, SD: 0.6), or all-neutral (mean: 2.5 s, 
SD: 0.6).  
 Help: Predicted main effects of outcome and belief were observed. Agents producing 
positive outcomes were judged more morally praiseworthy than agents producing neutral 
outcomes (positive: 2.71, neutral: 2.20; F(1, 11)=42.9 p=4.1x10-5, partial η2=0.69). Agents with 
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“positive” beliefs were judged more morally praiseworthy than agents with “neutral” beliefs 
(positive: 2.98, neutral: 1.93; F(1, 11)=55.2 p=1.3x10-5, partial η2=0.77). An interaction between 
outcome and belief was also observed (F(1, 11)=6.1 p=0.03, partial η2=0.36), such that belief 
(neutral vs. positive) made a greater difference in the case of positive outcomes, as compared to 
neutral outcomes. That is, attempted help received little praise.  
 Judgments of positive beliefs (mean: 2.2 s) were faster than neutral beliefs (mean: 2.6 s; 
F(1, 11)=9.7 p=0.01, partial η2=0.47); judgments of positive outcomes (mean: 2.2 s) were also 
faster than neutral outcomes (mean: 2.6 s; F(1, 11)=19.8 p=0.001, partial η2=0.64). There was 
no interaction between belief and outcome.  
 
Moral Judgment: fMRI Results  
 We calculated the average percent signal change (PSC) from rest in each region of interest 
(ROI) for the critical segment of each story (22 - 26 s), at which point all the critical information 
(i.e. belief and outcome) for moral judgment was available (see Supplementary Information). We 
expected the differential response to occur during this time, based on previous results, and the 
structure and timing of the stimuli (Young, et al., 2007; Young & Saxe, 2008). As in the 
behavioral analyses, the neural responses for harm and help were analyzed using separate 2 x 2 
outcome by belief repeated measures ANOVAs (Figure 3).  
 Harm: We replicated our previous results using similar stimuli (Young, et al., 2007; Young 
& Saxe, 2008): a belief by outcome interaction in the RTPJ (F(1, 16)=6.6 p=0.02, partial 
η2=0.29). Specifically, for negative outcomes, there was no difference between neutral beliefs 
(mean PSC: 0.39) and negative beliefs (mean PSC: 0.34), but for neutral outcomes, there was a 
significant difference between neutral beliefs (mean PSC: 0.37) and negative beliefs (mean PSC: 
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0.52; t(16)=3.317 p=0.004). As in previous research (Young, et al., 2007; Young & Saxe, 2008), 
planned comparisons also revealed that PSC for attempted harm was higher than for each of the 
other conditions (accidental harm: t(16)=2.6 p=0.02; intentional harm: t(13)=-3.3 p=0.004).  
Consistent with this ROI analysis, a random effects whole-brain analysis (p<0.001, uncorrected) 
revealed greater activation of attempted harm (negative belief, neutral outcome) as compared to 
non-harm (neutral belief, neutral outcome) stories in the RTPJ (average peak voxel coordinates 
[56 -59 24]). (No brain regions were found using a more stringent threshold (p < 0.05, family-
wise correction), consistent with the higher power of functional ROI analyses to detect subtle but 
systematic response profiles (Saxe, et al., 2006).)  
 A belief by outcome interaction was also observed in the LTPJ (F(1, 16)=17.5 p=0.001, 
partial η2=0.52; Figure 4) and DMPFC (F(1, 16)=5.7 p=0.03, partial η2=0.31; Figure 5). These 
effects were similar but less selective than those in the RTPJ: the LTPJ response showed 
differences between attempted harm and the true belief conditions, i.e. intentional harm (mean 
PSC: 0.35; t(16)=-3.1 p=0.007) and all-neutral (mean PSC: 0.40; t(16)=3.9 p=0.001); but no 
difference between the two false belief conditions, i.e. attempted harm (mean PSC: 0.56) and 
accidental harm (mean PSC: 0.48; p=0.30). In the DMPFC response, only a difference between 
attempted harm (mean PSC: 0.82) and intentional harm (mean PSC: 0.53) was observed (t(16)=-
2.4 p=0.03); the responses for all-neutral (mean PSC: 0.65) and accidental harm (mean PSC: 
0.72) were intermediate. The PC, MMPFC, and VMPFC showed no significant effects. 
 Help: For the help cases, we observed a main effect of belief in the RTPJ (F(1, 16)=5.7 
p=0.03, partial η2=0.26). Importantly, this main effect was qualified by a belief by outcome 
interaction, complementary to the interaction observed in the harm cases (F(1, 16)=19.8 
p=4.0x10 -4, partial η2=0.55): for positive outcomes, there was a difference between neutral 
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beliefs (mean PSC: 0.53) and positive beliefs (mean PSC: 0.27; t(16)=4.1 p=0.001); for neutral 
outcomes, there was no difference between neutral beliefs (mean PSC: 0.41) and positive beliefs 
(mean PSC: 0.46). Consistent with this ROI analysis, a random effects whole-brain analysis 
(p<0.001, uncorrected) revealed greater activation of accidental help (neutral belief, positive 
outcome) as compared to intentional help (positive belief, positive outcome) in the RTPJ 
(average peak voxel coordinates [60 -56 34]), though no brain regions were found using a more 
stringent threshold (p < 0.05, family-wise correction). 
 A belief by outcome interaction was also observed in the LTPJ (F(1, 16)=8.7 p=0.009, 
partial η2=0.35): for neutral outcomes, there was no difference between neutral beliefs (mean 
PSC: 0.58) and positive beliefs (mean PSC: 0.51); and for positive outcomes, there was a 
difference between neutral beliefs (mean PSC: 0.63) and positive beliefs (mean PSC: 0.45; 
t(16)=2.4 p=0.03). A main effect of belief was observed in the MMPFC (F(1, 16)=5.9 p=0.04, 
partial η2=0.37); a higher response was observed for positive beliefs (mean PSC: 0.38) than 
neutral beliefs (mean PSC: 0.21). The PC, DMPFC, and VMPFC showed no significant effects. 
 Harm versus Help: We found no main effect of harm versus help in the RTPJ PSC 
(t(16)=0.4 p=0.70) or any other ROI except for the LTPJ. The LTPJ PSC was higher for help 
(mean PSC: 0.52) than for harm (mean PSC: 0.45, t(16)=2.8 p=0.01), but random effects whole 
brain analyses of differential activation for positive (help) versus negative (harm) scenarios 
yielded no significant clusters (p < 0.05, family-wise correction). Critically, though, the pattern 
of activation in the RTPJ was significantly different for help versus harm scenarios with respect 
to the false belief cases (attempted help / harm and accidental help / harm). In particular, when 
we compared the difference for attempted versus accidental help to attempted versus accidental 
harm, the RTPJ response was greater for attempts than accidents in the case of harm and greater 
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for accidents than attempts in the case of help, as predicted and as indicated by a significant 
interaction between condition (attempt vs. accident) and valence (harm vs. help) in a 2 x 2 
repeated measures ANOVA (F(1, 16)=4.4 p=0.05, partial η2=0.21). 
 
General Discussion 
 At the broadest level, the current study underscores the critical role for theory of mind in 
moral judgments of blame and praise. Both blame and praise judgments were influenced not only 
by the action’s outcome but also the actor’s mental state. Correspondingly, brain regions 
including the RTPJ, LTPJ, and MPFC, known to support theory of mind, were recruited across 
harm and help scenarios, indicating that both blame and praise depend on computations 
occurring in the same neural substrates for theory of mind. The following discussion will 
therefore focus on how the neural evidence informs the specific role of mental states in morality, 
across blame and praise, and how the results specifically address the Intuitive Prosecutor versus 
Goal Incompletion Hypotheses. Is mental state information processed differently for different 
moral judgments, across harmful and helpful actions? 
 
The role of the RTPJ in “intuitive prosecution” 
 The results of the current study replicate and resolve a previous puzzle about theory of 
mind in moral judgment. We aimed to test two alternative interpretations of a previously 
observed neural pattern: selective enhancement of RTPJ activation for failed attempts to harm 
(Young, et al., 2007; Young & Saxe, 2008). On the Intuitive Prosecutor Hypothesis, the 
enhanced activation reflects greater attention to or deeper processing of mental state information 
that supports a negative moral judgment. On the Goal Incompletion Hypothesis, the enhanced 
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activation reflects greater processing of salient goals that are not completed. Consistent with the 
Intuitive Prosecutor Hypothesis, we found that the RTPJ response was greater for failed attempts 
than accidents in the case of harm, and greater for accidents than failed attempts in the case of 
help. More precisely, the RTPJ response discriminated between neutral and negative beliefs 
when the outcome was neutral (but not negative) for blame, and between neutral and positive 
beliefs when the outcome was positive (but not neutral) for praise. The RTPJ response may 
therefore reflect finer mental state discriminations when outcomes are neutral or positive, 
“working overtime” to detect “bad beliefs” especially when there’s no other reason to blame or 
withhold praise from the agent. Participants thus served as “intuitive prosecutors” (Haidt, 2007; 
Tetlock, 2002), seeking mental state evidence to assign blame and withhold praise in morally 
ambiguous situations.  
 As such, these results are consistent with the broader phenomenon of moral rationalization 
– people search, post hoc, for evidence to support their moral judgments (M. S. Gazzaniga, 2000; 
Haidt, 2001; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; D. A. Pizarro, Laney, Morris, & Loftus, 2006; 
Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). For example, when participants are unable to explain why they take 
incest to be morally wrong even in the absence of procreation, physical or emotional harm, they 
are “morally dumbfounded” (Haidt, 2001). At that point, participants often appeal to 
hypothetical harms or other invented consequences to rationalize their judgment.  
 
An asymmetry between blame and praise  
 The current results show greater processing of mental states that support negative moral 
judgments, for assigning moral blame and withholding moral praise. These results relate 
specifically to other functional neuroimaging and behavioral research showing greater attention 
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to mental states for negative versus positive judgments. Prior behavioral work, for example, has 
shown that participants judge impulsive crimes (e.g., crimes of passion) as less morally 
blameworthy than deliberate or premeditated crimes but impulsive and deliberate charitable 
behavior as equally morally praiseworthy (D. Pizarro, et al., 2003). In other research, participants 
have been shown to attribute greater intent to agents bringing about negative versus positive 
side-effects (Knobe, 2003, 2005). In one example, a CEO implements a profitable program, 
foreseeing that he will help / harm the environment as a side-effect of his action, though he has 
no intention to help / harm the environment. Participants judge the CEO as intentionally harming 
– but not helping – the environment.  
 Our own recent work has shown that participants appeal to mental state information 
especially when assigning moral blame (Kliemann, Young, Scholz, & Saxe, 2008; Young, 
Nichols, & Saxe, in press). When participants made negative moral judgments of disliked actors, 
they judged their harmful actions as more morally blameworthy and more intentional. These 
negative judgments were also accompanied by an increase in the RTPJ response, indicating 
greater processing of mental states for negative moral judgments. The neural evidence in the 
current study suggests that our participants engaged in more mental state reasoning when making 
negative moral judgments, assigning blame and withholding praise. Though we observed no 
overall effect of blame versus praise, the detailed pattern of results suggests that neural substrates 
for processing mental states are recruited more robustly when mental states uniquely license 
negative moral judgments.  
 
Reverse inference and other functions of the RTPJ  
 Our interpretation of the current results relies on a “reverse” inference, taking activity in a 
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brain region (i.e. the RTPJ) to be evidence for the engagement of a specific cognitive process 
(i.e. extra mental state processing). The validity of a reverse inference depends on the prior 
evidence of the target brain region’s selectivity for the cognitive process in question (Poldrack, 
2006; Young & Saxe, 2009a). Of the regions implicated in theory of mind, the RTPJ appears to 
be especially selective for processing mental states such as beliefs, in and outside the moral 
domain (Perner, et al., 2006; Saxe & Powell, 2006 ; Young & Saxe, 2008).  
 In other research, however, nearby regions have been implicated in attention to unexpected 
stimuli (Corbetta, Kincade, Ollinger, McAvoy, & Shulman, 2000; Mitchell, 2007), including 
unexpected human actions (Buccino, et al., 2007; Grezes, Frith, & Passingham, 2004; Pelphrey, 
Morris, & McCarthy, 2004), as well as other inconsistent information (Ferstl, Neumann, Bogler, 
& von Cramon, 2008; Simos, Basile, & Papanicolaou, 1997; Virtue, Parrish, & Jung-Beeman, 
2008). Could the current results be due to differences in attention across the conditions (e.g., 
attempted / accidental harm / help) of the current study? We think this alternative unlikely for the 
following four reasons.  
 First, there is no a priori reason why attempted harm and accidental help (versus accidental 
harm and attempted help, where mental state and outcome factors also conflict) should lead to 
more shifts of attention. All stimuli were presented verbally in similar language across 
conditions. Harm and help scenarios were also matched for word count across conditions. 
Moreover, shifts of attention are generally accompanied by slower reaction times, but we 
observed no reaction time differences between the critical conditions (e.g. Attempted Harm or 
Accidental Help, versus All Neutral).  
 Second, a recent study, using higher resolution imaging and a bootstrap analysis, found a 
small but reliable separation between the peaks of functional regions for attention versus theory 
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of mind in higher resolution images (Scholz, Triantafyllou, Whitfield-Gabrieli, Brown, & Saxe, 
2009), consistent with evidence from a recent meta-analysis (Decety & Lamm, 2007).  
 Third, in another recent fMRI study, participants read stories describing mental or physical 
states, which were unexpected or expected; the RTPJ response was significantly higher for 
mental versus physical states but not sensitive to the difference between unexpected and 
expected stories in either domain (Young, Dodell-Feder, & Saxe, in press).  
 Finally, previously observed activations patterns for unexpected human actions have been 
mostly centered on the superior temporal sulcus (STS) rather than the functional region of the 
RTPJ for theory of mind; furthermore, processing unexpected (versus expected) human actions 
may engage not only greater attention but greater theory of mind, that is, reasoning about the 
beliefs and intentions of the actor. 
 
MPFC and social cognition   
 The DMPFC showed a similar but less selective pattern compared to the RTPJ for harm 
scenarios of the current task. Previous research suggests that the MPFC is recruited not for 
encoding explicit belief information (Saxe & Powell, 2006 ) but more broadly for moral 
cognition (Ciaramelli, Muccioli, Ladavas, & di Pellegrino, 2007; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, 
Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Koenigs, et al., 2007; Mendez, Anderson, & Shapira, 2005) and social 
cognition (Adolphs, 2003; Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006). Recent work suggests a role for 
the DMPFC in reasoning about the desires or valenced attitudes of individuals dissimilar to 
oneself; by contrast, a more ventral region of MPFC was implicated in judging the 
desires/attitudes of individuals similar to oneself (Adolphs, 2003; Mitchell, et al., 2006). It is 
therefore possible that the DMPFC activation reflects desire inferences – including negative 
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desires in the case of attempted harm. The DMPFC did not, however, show selective effects in 
the case of positive desires, for the help scenarios. Future work should characterize the 
distinction between beliefs and desires, and the functional roles of different brain regions in 
processing different mental state content.   
 
Conclusions 
 With few exceptions (Haidt, 2003; see Takahashi, et al., 2008 for comparisons between 
emotional responses to “moral depravity” versus “moral beauty”), prior cognitive neuroscience 
research has focused primarily on moral judgments of harmful actions, as well as other violations 
of moral norms (e.g., breaking promises, committing incest). The current study suggests that 
theory of mind processes may be disproportionately engaged when participants assign blame in 
the absence of a harmful outcome or withhold praise in the presence of a helpful outcome, that 
is, when participants become “intuitive prosecutors” and search for and attend to evidence in 
support of a (relatively) negative moral verdict.  
 In the future, the present paradigm may be useful for research into moral evaluations of in-
group versus out-group members. In the presence of a group boundary, participants maybe 
differentially motivated to blame and praise and differentially motivated to take internal (mental 
state) versus external information into account. Detailed understanding of the neural basis of 
moral blame and praise, theory of mind, and their relationship may then provide a window into 


































Figure 1a. Schematic representation of sample help (left) and harm (right) scenarios. Changes 
across conditions are highlighted in bolded text. “Background” information sets the scene. 
“Foreshadow” information foreshadows whether the action will result in a positive/negative or 
neutral outcome. “Belief” information states whether the protagonist holds a belief that she is in 
a positive/negative situation and that action will result in a positive/negative outcome 
(positive/negative belief) or a belief that she is in a neutral situation and that action will result in 
a neutral outcome (neutral belief). “Action” information describes the action and its outcome. 
Subjects made praise/blame judgments of protagonists’ actions. Sentences corresponding to each 





Figure 1b. Schematic representation of a single moral judgment trial. Stories were presented in 
four cumulative segments, each presented for 6 s, for a total presentation time of 24 s per story. 
The story was then removed, and replaced by a question, for 4 s, concerning how much moral 
blame (for harm scenarios) or praise (for help) the protagonist deserves for acting, from none (1) 
to a lot (4). During the critical segment (shaded), all morally relevant information was made 
available for participants to use in moral judgment.  
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Figure 2. Moral praise (left) and blame (right) judgments. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
  30 
Figure 3. Percent signal change (PSC) from rest in the RTPJ for praise (left) and blame (right). 




Figure 4. Percent signal change (PSC) from rest in the LTPJ for praise (left) and blame (right). 




Figure 4. Percent signal change (PSC) from rest in the DMPFC for praise (left) and blame 




Table 1. Localizer experiment results  
 
 
Average peak voxels for ROIs in Montreal Neurological Institute coordinates. The “Individual 
ROIs” columns show the average peak voxels for individual subjects’ ROIs. The “Whole-brain 
contrast” columns show the peak voxel in the same regions in the whole-brain random-effects 
group analysis.   
